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Abstract
Simulators are a staple of any engineering project and manned space flight in particular. From
pilot and crew training to maintenance and emergency repairs, very little is done without it first
being thoroughly practiced and refined during advance simulation. Whether the simulation uses
a computerized flight simulator that recreates the physics and experience of flight, or a simple
mock-up with paper cutouts and hand tools, the end result is the same: people learn to make
better and safer decisions through advanced simulation and practice. However, there are no
simulation tools in use to help NASA managers to understand the dynamics of systemic risk, or
how to evaluate the inherent risk within an organization.
This thesis describes the development of a risk management simulator that will enable NASA
managers to explore the dynamics of risk using an advanced system dynamics simulation of the
NASA safety culture prior to the Columbia Shuttle accident. This simulation model was
developed by MIT Professor Nancy Leveson and her students as part of a NASA USRA research
grant and has over 700 variables and several sub models. While the model is eminently useful to
those familiar with system dynamics, the Vensim software application and the specific model
structure, it is not very useful as a learning tool for those who are not.
The simulator tool developed for this thesis simplifies and consolidates the overall model
behavior into 8 decision variables and 35 display variables. Moreover, 18 of those display
variables are grouped into one of 5 categories of "leading indicators" of risk. This simulator
enables any user to quickly begin to explore the system model and to discover the consequences
of different decisions on system risk, without any need for the user to know system dynamics
theory or any details of the model design. In a video game the user doesn't know how it is
programmed, but is still able to learn the rules of the game, how it behaves and-most
importantly-how to win. Similarly, the goal of the risk management flight simulator is to help
NASA managers to learn the rules of system risk, how system risk behaves in response to
management decisions, and, most importantly, how to make the best informed risk decisions.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Problem outline
This thesis summarizes the development of a risk management tool that was designed to better
enable NASA managers and decision makers to understand the complex system dynamics that
underscore system risk. Following the Columbia shuttle accident in 2003, Leveson et. al.
developed a sophisticated system model of the engineering and safety culture at NASA to better
understand and characterize the cultural and socio-political aspects of risk. The model was
developed using a commercial off-the-shelf ("COTS") product, Vensim, which provides an easy
method to describe a system and the interactions between the system components. Vensim, and
other tools like it, were born from the ground-breaking work of Jim Forrester and John Sterman
and have been used widely to describe systems varying from "predator-prey" population models
(i.e., the inter-relationship between rabbit and fox populations in a closed environment) to
supplier-consumer distribution models (i.e., the infamous "beer game") to product marketing
"flight simulators" (i.e., the complex dynamics of pricing a product and resource allocation) and
many others. Leveson, however, took system dynamics into a relatively new area: modeling
system safety culture. Specifically, they sought to develop a tool that could be used to better
understand the dynamics behind the breakdown in safety culture that led to the Columbia
disaster. The model was based upon previous work using STAMP (a "Systems Theoretic
Accident Modeling and Processes") that "...integrates all aspects of risk including organizational
and social aspects."[1] In its simplest form, the model is relatively easy to describe. For
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example, with each successful launch, NASA managersI may come to believe that safety
concerns and objections are increasingly overrated based on the erroneous belief that success =
"proof' of system safety. (i.e., insulating foam has come off the shuttle external fuel tank on all
previous launches and there wasn't a problem, hence falling foam is "safe".) This increasing
(false) confidence in the inherent safety of the system, along with budgetary concerns and
external pressure, then leads to an increasing performance pressure to "do more with less" and a
concomitant pressure to have more (successful) launches.
schematically below.
This relationship can be described
Performance Pressure
Perceived Success By Launch RateHigh-Level , + Successful
Management * Launc hRa
Figure 1-1 Schematic representation of the performance feedback loop. With each succesful launch, pressure
from management leads to further increases in the launch rate
The term "Manager" leaves a lot of room for ambiguity. In our context when we say manager we are referring to a
person that has decision-making authority over the allocation of personnel and resources as well as those persons
who have primary authority and approval for when NASA can proceed with a shuttle launch. While it may be true
that "everyone is responsible for safety", and anyone with a significant safety concern can impact a shuttle launch
decision, in practice, when "everyone" is responsible, no one is. Hence, the decision to base the model on the
assumption that there are those who by nature of their unique position have the ultimate decision-making authority
in many ways represents the reality of system safety vs. organizational goals of system safety.
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Of course, we recognize that such a positive feedback loop cannot go on forever and there are
numerous feedbacks and other systems that support, inhibit and feed off of this loop. This was
developed and shown as Figure 3 in [7] (below).
Pudget +~ys ~j
cuts Budget cuts
directed toward
safetySafety
system Of
safety safey increase
Pri^y Of efforts
safety programs
- robk-s have
jog 1been &ard
Punb to Compwency
Skg?)
Succesus sate of increase in ompoacency
Perforrmnce+
Pressure ++
Rol Perceived Rs
xpectatio+ safety Rs
PLW* nthe+
Launch Rate Sccs
Success Rate
Accident Rate
Figure 1-2 Simplified model of the Dynamics Behind the Shuttle Columbia Loss by Leveson & Dulac
We see that there are several inter-connecting loops and it is a little more complicated, but
intrinsically, it looks pretty straightforward. Were that this was all there was to the model, we
would be done. But, of course, real systems are significantly more complex than this and to
develop this "simple" model there are, in fact, more than 700 variables in the Vensim model that
underlie this diagram and the overall model becomes so complex that all but those who are
intimately familiar with it are unable to understand how it works. In other words, we have a
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model that is so complex that it is usable only by a few academics. And, while this might
provide job security for those so inclined, our goal is disseminate and share this model with
NASA managers so that they can use it to better understand system safety and, hopefully, gain a
greater appreciation of the complex dynamics of system safety at NASA. There are two
fundamental ways to approach this problem. We can either, (1) teach all NASA managers a
graduate course in system dynamics, the Vensim application and the specific model design, or
(2) develop a simplified "front end" to the model so that someone with very little training can
immediately begin to use the model as a learning tool without becoming bogged down in the
minutiae of the model design and system dynamics theory.
This, then, is the problem statement and the goal of this thesis: To develop a simplified interface
to the system dynamics model so that NASA managers can use the model as a risk management
tool.
1.2 Thesis goals
In addition to developing a simpler user interface to the system dynamics model, the goal of this
thesis is that it can be used, as a learning tool, to help decision makers better understand systemic
risk. This understanding is particularly important as it becomes increasingly apparent that the
traditional methods of risk management such as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), fault tree
analysis and so forth, do not adequately account for programmatic and human-system-interface
risk (See, for example, a discussion of E. Co/i poisoning of the public water supply in
Walkerton, ON that led to several deaths in [5], or even a discussion of the "Therac-25" incident
in [6]. In both cases the standard safety methods and tools failed to protect lives due to a lack of
awareness of the complexity of system safety.)
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Put more simply, in a NASA frame of reference, the Columbia Shuttle accident was not a case of
what are referred to as, "unknown unknowns", causing the loss of shuttle and crew. On the
contrary, NASA management was fully aware that foam had been a recurring problem, that
Atlantis only 3 months prior had foam impact the shuttle a mere 6 inches from a critical
electrical junction box and-most importantly-within hours of the launch of the Columbia a
post-launch film review indicated that the largest piece of insulating foam to have ever fallen off
in the history of the shuttle program had impacted the critical leading edge of the wing at a speed
of over 600 mph and appeared to have possibly caused some damage to the shuttle. But, due to
an overconfidence in the perceived safety that insulating foam had never previously caused an
accident, NASA management did not take any steps to further investigate the damage (e.g.,
having the military take high resolution photos of the damaged area) or plan for the possibility of
a damaged thermal tiles on reentry. (Recall the loop in Figure 1-1). We can be sure that this
type of accident is less likely to happen again, and certainly without a thorough analysis. But,
the weakness of existing safety analyses is that by definition they rely upon the unstated
assumption that human-system interfaces are "working" and that a risk is adequately described
and appropriately evaluated. PRA and safety analyses are not enough. NASA decision makers
need to understand the dynamics that underlie system safety so they can evaluate the "health" of
their safety system and its ability to appropriately evaluate risk.
To this end, the work of this thesis is to accomplish several goals. These are:
1. To develop a working version of the model shown in [5], that encapsulates the model
complexity so that users can more readily understand the broad macroscopic effects of
decisions on system safety.
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2. To design and program a user interface to the system dynamics base model that will
enabled any user with only a short introduction into its use to be able to explore the
model dynamics.
3. To develop the interface program so that it can be used (or further developed) into a risk
management tool so that NASA managers can modify a subset of the model inputs (such
as launch rate or the percentage of contracting to 3rd parties) and see how these changes
affect risk over time.
4. To develop the interface program so that users can track the "leading [risk] indicators"
from [2] as the model inputs are modified (over time) and to display them in a likelihood-
severity 3 x 4 risk matrix as is commonly used by NASA management to assess risk.
5. To develop the user interface so that it can be upgraded and expanded to incorporate
different case scenarios such as external budget and performance requirements.
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2 Risk Management Tools and Management Simulators
2.1 History of simulators
It is no coincidence that interactive simulations are often called, "flight simulators" regardless of
their aeronautical or terrestrial goals. Some of the earliest training and simulation tools were first
developed to help train pilots. As early as the Wright brothers, it was recognized that system
complexity required a different level of training. In WW-I, Edwin Link developed the first
mechanical flight simulator which later proved to be used extensively by the US military in
WW-II to train pilots how to fly without jeopardizing equipment or personnel.
Figure 2-1 WW-11 Link Training Simulator
These training simulators were very simple and did not mimic the actual aerodynamics and
feedback of a real airplane, but they did enable a student pilot to become familiar with the basic
control and operation of an airplane. It was not until the late 1940's, with project "Whirlwind"
developed at MIT, that the first (analog) computer simulation was used to provide immediate
feedback to the user based on mathematical modeling of aerodynamic response. Not only was
this to become a seminal event in digital computing and computer simulation, but the lead
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computer designer of the project and inventor of "core memory" was Dr. Jay Forrester who
would later develop the theory of system dynamics upon which this thesis is based.
Figure 2-2 Photograph of the Whirlwind computer. Jay Forrester is on the far left next to Dr. Norman
Taylor who is pointing. (1952) [Picture used with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. Copyright C The
Mitre Corporation. All rights reserved.]
Eventually flight simulators became more and more complex to the point where we are today:
flight simulators so closely mimic the actual flying experience that they have become a necessary
staple of training pilots in flight safety, procedures and aerodynamics. In fact, in most any
complex system that involves severe consequences when there is mishap-and where it is
impractical or unsafe to train on the real system-we are likely to find a computer simulator to
help train operators how to respond in the event of an accident. The nuclear power industry, for
example, has full mock-ups of the reactor control room with a sophisticated computer model
behind it for operators to practice emergency procedures without the risk of an accident or a loss
of plant availability (which is costly).
With the advent of the computer, another type of simulator arose in the 1980's and 1990's-
business simulations. These simulations require the development of a complex mathematical
model to simulate some aspect of a business cycle or process such as new product development
or resource allocation. These tools enable business managers to learn about the dynamics of the
Page 17 of 118
particular challenge and to practice and hone their skills and understanding in a safe
environment.
2.2 Learning with simulators
There are, of course, many different ways that people learn. We tend to learn incrementally,
building upon previous knowledge on step at a time. Figure 4.1 of Learning Through Simulations
(Fripp [18] ) shows the Kolb learning model reproduced below.
Concrete
Experiences
/V
Testing implications or Observation and
concepts in new situations Reflection
Formation of abstract
concepts and -
generalizations
Figure 2-3 The experiential learning model [Kolb 19, reproduced with permission in Fripp p.41]
The key point of this diagram is that learning is a process that is based upon a combination of
concrete and abstract experiences that are then tested and observed/reflected upon. Different
people learn in different ways and Fripp spends some time talking about the importance of
different learning styles, i.e., What works for some does not work well for others. For our
purposes, however, we are less interested in an individual's particular learning style than the
observation that, if the Kolb model is correct, regardless of style if one is to truly learn a new
concept then it must involve the whole cycle. If any one leg is missing then regardless of how
well the other three are mastered the ability to apply the new skill is limited. For example, one
can read about tennis (abstract concepts), watch others play tennis (observation & reflection),
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and even bounce a tennis ball on a racquet or over a net a few times (concrete experiences). If
you have never actually played tennis (testing concepts in new situations), however, it is highly
unlikely that you will be ready for tournament play. Furthermore, it is not enough for the
learning structure to be in place for effective learning to take place. The participant has to want
to learn so that he can be an active participant. As pointed out by Fripp (p 41), "For people to
learn most effectively, the subject matter must therefore either have intrinsic interest to them, or
they will need to have their interest stimulated in some way." (Many of us may remember a
great professor who made a boring class fun and interesting by stimulating our interest).
So, how do we learn? The options are varied: lectures, classes, on-the-job training, mentoring
and coaching, on-line information, case studies and, of course, simulations. All of us have used
one or more of these at different times of our lives, but simulations offer several distinct
advantages not available with any of the other methods. These include:
" They provide immersion-the participant can immerse oneself within the simulation and
act as if it is not a simulation.
" They are a safe environment to make mistakes with no risk of financial loss or equipment
damage
" They can be team-based, or individual
* They can simulate extreme situations that would not ordinarily be available
* They work with all four stages of the Kolb model: encouraging the participant to test new
concepts, gain concrete knowledge and facts and the opportunity for reflection during and
after the simulation
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" A well designed simulation can convey system interactions and dependencies
" They can be FUN, which make the learning all the more enjoyable and memorable.
What are the disadvantages of simulations?
Fripp discusses several: They can be complex and time-consuming to design and build: If the
simulation is too easy then participants try to "beat the game" and if they are too complicated
then participants may give up and lose interest.
But, overall, a well-designed simulation can be an ideal learning environment-especially for
endeavors such as space flight, which have such extreme risks and costs associated with failure.
What are some of the features of a simulation that might encourage effective learning?
Fripp discusses three kinds of managerial learning, "cerebral learning," "skills learning" and
"transformational learning," and-as with the Kolb model-effective learning involves all three.
Aldrich in, Simulations and the future of learning : an innovative (and perhaps revolutionary)
approach to e-learning (Aldrich [8]) emphasizes the importance of simulations that have the
following features (Aldrich, Pg. 9):
" Authentic and relevant scenarios
" Applied pressure situations that tap user's emotions and force them to act
" A sense of unrestricted options and,
* Replayability
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In terms of how one learns through a simulation "game" Aldrich discusses three different
"contents", what he calls the three "primary colors" of learning in game simulations: Cyclical,
Open-Ended and Linear.
2.2.1 Cyclical learning
Cyclical learning is familiar to all of us as learning by rote. With each iteration we gain a better
understanding of the system and improve our skills. Simulators based upon cyclical learning
teach through repetition and practice. Arguably, all learning involves some fraction of repetition
as we imprint a neural behavior. Certainly in aeronautical flight simulators we see cyclical
learning in areas such as emergency response procedures so that "common" mishaps become
familiar to the pilot. However, cyclical learning as a primary simulation method is more
prevalent in other industries such as medicine, where the student needs to practice a procedure
"until he gets it right." Examples of simulators run from the very simple-such as the "resusci-
annie" doll familiar to Red Cross CPR students-to the increasingly more complex and realistic
simulation tools for medical students to practice medical procedures. 2
If we extend the definition of "simulator" to include system mock-ups and dry runs, we can see
that cyclical learning is used in many more industries where it is desirable to have personnel
practice a complicated procedure in some form of a simulated environment. Nuclear technicians,
for example, will practice a nuclear refueling procedure until management is confident that there
will be safety through familiarity. Other examples include aircraft and spacecraft maintenance,
surgical operating procedures, military "war games", and even school fire drills. How do we
differentiate between cyclical learning simulations vs. simply practicing a skill (such as playing
tennis or golf) through repetition? I would suggest that the principle difference is that a
2 See for example the products available from the company "Limbs and Things Ltd." www.limbsandthings.com
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simulation requires some degree of imagination on the part of the participant. If she is acting as
if there is some alternate reality (a fire, emergency, real radioactive fuel present, etc.), then it is a
simulation. If there is no suspension of disbelief, then it is not.
2.2.2 Linear learning
As the name implies, linear learning is a time-based, one step follows the previous form of
learning. Most classes are taught this way, as well as story narratives and it is the most common
method for learning a new skill. Linear learning is familiar to us because we experience time as
linear. Most simulators, however, are not based upon linear learning. A pilot in a flight
simulator can re-play the same event over and over until he is comfortable with his performance
regardless of the flow of time. Interestingly, however, because system dynamics uses time as its
integrating variable, linear learning does come into play with respect to system dynamics based
simulators such as this thesis. As described later in this thesis, the risk management tool has a
user step forward through time (the default is 6 months per iteration) so that she can understand
and evaluate the time-based nature of safety and risk accumulation. If a user wants to re-examine
or improve her performance, then she must go back to the beginning and step forward through
time again making the appropriate choices along the way. So, while linear learning does not see
much use in class simulators, it is used to a degree in this context.
2.2.3 Open-ended learning
Open-ended learning is perhaps the "holy grail" of all good simulations. It involves an
understanding of trade-offs and recognition that a system is dynamic with various feedbacks. It
is also very much the same concept as Fripp's "transformational" learning. Humans are uniquely
gifted with the ability to adapt to a new situation and apply their knowledge of the system to take
the best course of action when presented with an unknown. Modern aircraft flight simulators are
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designed to combine open-ended learning-presenting the student with an unanticipated event
-with cyclical learning until he or she "gets it right." Open-ended learning is about teaching the
participant about the system dynamics so that he can make an informed decision based upon that
knowledge. This is the ultimate goal of this thesis as well-to teach NASA managers about the
dynamics of system safety; not in terms of component and mechanical systems (for which NASA
has numerous tools to evaluate the risk, cost and severity of a failure) but in terms of the overall
socio-technical system itself.
2.3 Risk management tools in use by NASA
NASA uses several risk management tools depending on the type and nature of the project. If
managing cost and schedule are of primary import, a project is likely to use continuous risk
management (CRM) along with a database tool to simplify the integration and reporting of
system risks. Supporting CRM, or perhaps as a separate effort, there will be probabilistic risk
assessments (PRA), often combined with a fault tree analysis, that seek to quantify and identify
the most significant risks of mechanical or system failure. PRA is also used (and misused) to
normalize risk so that different risks can be compared in terms of failures per number of events
and even to make risk "trade offs"-literally moving risk from one system to another as if it
were a physical quantity that could be traded between systems. (See, for example, "Risk as a
Resource" [11] which grew from NASA's "faster, better, cheaper" initiative)
2.3.1 Continuous risk management (CRM)
An outcome of NASA's faster, better, cheaper (FBC) initiative is extensive use of continuous
risk management. CRM aims to track and control budget, schedule and program risk through six
steps: identify, analyze, plan, track & control.
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NASA RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS
Program / Project4
constraints
Risk data: test data, expert
opinion, hazard analysis, -q
FMEA, lessons learned,
technical analysis
KStatements of risk+ List of risks
Risk evaluation
+ Risk classification
Risk prioritization
Resources 4--
Program/project data 4-
(metrics information)
TRACK
Monitor risk metrics and
verify/validate mitigation actions
CONTROL
Decide to replan mitigations, close risks,
invoke contingency plans, or continue to
track risks
Risk mitigation plans
o Risk acceptance rationale
Risk tracking requirements
Risk status reports on:
-- Risks
- Risk mitigation plans
P+ Risk Decisions
Figure 2-4 NASA risk management process [111
This is often shown as a cyclic process indicating that the process is "continuous".
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IDENTIFY
Identify risk issues and concerns
V
ANALYZE
Evaluate (impact/severity, probability, time
frame), classify, and prioritize risks
PLAN
Decide what, if anything, should
be done about risks
Identfy~N
Figure 2-5 NASA CRM cycle diagram
The primary output of CRM is the generation of a 5x5 likelihood (probability) vs. severity
(impact) risk matrix that attempts to prioritize and focus attention on the most important risks.
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Figure 2-6 NASA likelihood vs. severity risk matrix
From a purely safety and risk perspective, the CRM process does not prioritize "risk" over cost
and schedule. A high likelihood and severity impact can easily be schedule risk or excessive
cost overruns. From a project risk management perspective, this is perfectly fine. But, from a
system technical risk perspective, it appears to be problematic. While, "of course" technical risk
is treated with respect, there is nothing in the CRM process that explicitly treats it any different.
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There are some signs, however, that this may be changing. At the NASA Risk Management
Conference VI, Wayne Hale, Manager of the Space Shuttle Program, noted that:
"The RM [Risk Management] system is only as good as the engineering that
informs it. The RM system can also lead to the illusion that we have a
comprehensive portrait ofprogram risk when we don't." [13]
At the same conference, John Turner, the Space Shuttle Program Risk Manager warned
participants [to] "Avoid Calculus with Crayons Syndrome (CWCS)-risk scores are at best
fuzzy"[14]. So, while CRM is still primarily focused on programmatic risk (cost and schedule)
vs. safety, there appears to be a greater appreciation for the limitations of it as well.
2.3.2 NASA Risk management applications
NASA has several risk management database and integration tools to assist in the management
of risk and the coordination of resources. These include, "Integrated Risk Management"
(IRMA) [16], "Risk Management Implementation Tool" (RMIT) [17], "Active Risk Manger"
(ARM) [15] as well as the "Glenn Risk Database", developed with Microsoft Access@. A
common feature of all of the tools is that they assist the user in following the risk management
process whenever a new risk is entered or updated. Typically, users can enter detailed
information, and generate reports and a 5x5 risk matrix to highlight the most important risks.
The most important take-away from all of these programs is that, as pointed out above, they are
project risk management tools, and not safety focused.
2.4 The case for a risk management simulator
The case for a risk management simulator is actually quite simple. Can anyone imagine an
astronaut piloting the shuttle without extensive practice in a flight simulator? The same goes for
emergency repairs and maintenance: workers will practice ("simulate") making the repair in a
safe environment to minimize the chance of a mistake on the real system. The answer to both of
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these hypotheticals is clearly, "no." In fact, we know that practically every facet of space flight
is practiced and simulated until the chance of operator error is remote. Given the great
prevalence of simulation in manned space flight it seems almost antithetical that there are no
tools available to help managers to practice (safety) risk management decision-making. But, that
is exactly the case because, quite simply, they do not appear to exist. More importantly, there
are no tools currently available to help managers to understand the risk consequences of project
management tradeoffs such as:
* If the budget requires either reducing the launch rate or contracting more work, which
decision is safer?
* If you are going to increase the amount of work contracted out, what measures should
you take to minimize the safety impact?
* Launching too many missions clearly has a safety impact, but is there a minimum launch
goal as well, below which risk increases?
* To what degree does schedule pressure-trying to do more with less-impact safety? Is
a little pressure good, or is it always bad?
* What are the leading indicators of a risk problem?
* Is it good to have a string of successful launches? What are the risks?
The goal of this thesis is to provide NASA with a tool that will enable just these types of
analyses and eventually, with further work, an on-line real-time risk management simulator as
well.
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3 System Dynamics Model of NASA Safety Culture
This simulation uses the system dynamics model developed by Leveson et.al. for the Phase I
final report for a USRA grant in February 2005 [7] with some minor modifications described
below.
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Figure 3-1 Simplified model of the dynamics behind the Shuttle Columbia loss [71
3.1 Model description
With the exception of the modifications described in Section 3.2, the model is essentially
unchanged from the original USRA, pre-Columbia model. The description of the model is
reproduced from that report. The model has several hundred variables grouped into one of 9
separate sub models. These models are:
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1. Launch Rate
2. System Safety Resource Allocation
3. System Safety Status
4. Incident Learning and Corrective Action
5. Technical Risk
6. System Safety Efforts and Efficacy
7. Shuttle Aging and Maintenance
8. System Safety Knowledge Skills and Staffing
9. Perceived Success by High-Level Management
It's important to note that the 9 sub models were developed to simplify creating the simulation
and do not necessarily correspond to major system dynamic driving forces.
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Figure 3-2 The 9 sub models in the system dynamics model
The description of each of the 9 sub models from [7] is reproduced below.
3.1.1.1 Technical Risk
The purpose of the technical risk model is to determine the level of occurrence of anomalies and
hazardous events, as well as the interval between accidents. The assumption behind the risk
formulation is that once the system has reached a state of high risk, it is highly vulnerable to
small deviations that can cascade into major accidents. The primary factors affecting the
technical risk of the system are the effective age of the Shuttle, the quantity and quality of
inspections aimed at uncovering and correcting safety problems, and the proactive hazard
analysis and mitigation efforts used to continuously improve the safety of the system. Another
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factor affecting risk is the response of the program to anomalies and hazardous events (and, of
course, mishaps or accidents).
The response to anomalies, hazardous events, and mishaps can either address the symptoms of
the underlying problem or the root causes of the problems. Corrective actions that address the
symptoms of a problem have insignificant effect on the technical risk and merely allow the
system to continue operating while the underlying problems remain unresolved. On the other
hand, corrective actions that address the root cause of a problem have a significant and lasting
positive effect on reducing the system technical risk.
3.1.1.2 System safety resource allocation
The purpose of the resource allocation model is to determine the level of resources allocated to
system safety. To do this, we model the factors determining the portion of NASA's budget
devoted to system safety. The critical factors here are the priority of the safety programs relative
to other competing priorities such as launch performance and NASA safety history. The model
assumes that if performance expectations are high or schedule pressure is tight, safety funding
will decrease, particularly if NASA has had past safe operations.
3.1.1.3 System safety status
The safety organization's status plays an important role throughout the model, particularly in
determining effectiveness in attracting high-quality employees and determining the likelihood of
other employees becoming involved in the system safety process. Additionally, the status of the
safety organization plays an important role in determining their level of influence, which in turn,
contributes to the overall effectiveness of the safety activities. Management prioritization of
system safety efforts plays an important role in this sub model, which in turn influences such
safety culture factors as the power and authority of the safety organization, resource allocation,
and rewards and recognition for raising safety concerns and placing emphasis on safety. In the
model, the status of the safety organization has an impact on the ability to attract highly capable
personnel; on the level of morale, motivation, and influence; and on the amount and
effectiveness of cross-boundary communication.
3.1.1.4 Safety knowledge, skills and staffing
The purpose of this sub model is to determine both the overall level of knowledge and skill in the
system safety organization and to determine if the number of NASA system safety engineers is
sufficient to oversee the contractors. The System Safety Effort and Efficacy sub model use these
two values.
In order to determine these key values, the model tracks four quantities: the number of NASA
employees working in system safety, the number of contractor system safety employees, the
aggregate experience of the NASA employees, and the aggregate experience of the system safety
contractors such as those working for United Space Alliance (USA) and other major Shuttle
contractors.
The staffing numbers rise and fall based on the hiring, firing, attrition, and transfer rates of the
employees and contractors. These rates are determined by several factors, including the amount
of safety funding allocated, the portion of work to be contracted out, the age of NASA
employees, and the stability of funding.
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The amount of experience of the NASA and contractor system safety engineers relates to the
new staff hiring rate and the quality of that staff. An organization that highly values safety will
be able to attract better employees who bring more experience and can learn faster than lower
quality staff. The rate at which the staff gains experience is also determined by training,
performance feedback, and the workload they face.
3.1.1.5 Shuttle aging and maintenance
The age of the Shuttle and the amount of maintenance, refurbishments, and safety upgrades
affects the technical risk of the system and the number of anomalies and hazardous events. The
effective Shuttle age is mainly influenced by the launch rate.
A higher launch rate will accelerate the aging of the Shuttle unless extensive maintenance and
refurbishment are performed. The amount of maintenance depends on the resources available for
maintenance at any given time. As the system ages, more maintenance may be required; if the
resources devoted to maintenance are not adjusted accordingly, accelerated aging will occur.
The original design of the system also affects the maintenance requirements. Many compromises
were made during the initial phase of the Shuttle design, trading off lower development costs for
higher operations costs. Our model includes the original level of design for maintainability,
which allows the investigation of scenarios during the analysis where system maintainability
would have been a high priority from the beginning.
While launch rate and maintenance affect the rate of Shuttle aging, refurbishment and upgrades
decrease the effective aging by providing complete replacements and upgrade of Shuttle systems
such as avionics, fuel systems, and structural components. The amount of upgrades and
refurbishment depends on the resources available, as well as on the perception of the remaining
life of the system.
Upgrades and refurbishment will most likely be delayed or canceled when there is high
uncertainty about the remaining operating life. Uncertainty will be higher as the system
approaches or exceeds its original design lifetime, especially if there is no clear vision and plan
about the future of the manned space program.
3.1.1.6 Launch rate
The Launch Rate sub model is at the core of the integrated model. Launch rate affects many parts
of the model, such as the perception of the level of success achieved by the Shuttle program. A
high launch rate without accidents contributes to the perception that the program is safe,
eventually eroding the priority of system safety efforts. A high launch rate also accelerates
system aging and creates schedule pressure, which hinders the ability of engineers to perform
thorough problem investigation and to implement effective corrective actions that address the
root cause of the problems rather than just the symptoms. The launch rate in the model is largely
determined by three factors:
1. Expectations from high-level management: Launch expectations will most likely be high
if the program has been successful in the recent past. The expectations are reinforced through a
"Pushing the Limits" phenomenon where administrators expect ever more from a successful
program, without necessarily providing the resources required to increase launch rate;
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2. Schedule pressure from the backlog of flights scheduled: This backlog is affected by the
launch commitments, which depend on factors such as ISS commitments, Hubble servicing
requirements, and other scientific mission constraints;
3. Launch delays that may be caused by unanticipated safety problems: The number of
launch delays depends on the technical risk, on the ability of system safety to uncover problems
requiring launch delays, and on the power and authority of system safety personnel to delay
launches.
3.1.1.7 System safety efforts and efficacy
This sub model captures the effectiveness of system safety at identifying, tracking, and
mitigating Shuttle system hazards. The success of these activities will affect the number of
hazardous events and problems identified, as well as the quality and thoroughness of the
resulting investigations and corrective actions. In the model, a combination of reactive problem
investigation and proactive hazard mitigation efforts leads to effective safety-related decision
making that reduces the technical risk associated with the operation of the Shuttle.
While effective system safety activities will improve safety over the long run, they may also
result in a decreased launch rate over the short run by delaying launches when serious safety
problems are identified.
The efficacy of the system safety activities depends on various factors. Some of these factors are
defined outside this sub model, such as the availability of resources to be allocated to safety and
the availability and effectiveness of safety processes and standards. Others depend on
characteristics of the system safety personnel themselves, such as their number, knowledge,
experience, skills, motivation, and commitment. These personal characteristics also affect the
ability of NASA to oversee and integrate the safety efforts of contractors, which is one
dimension of system safety effectiveness. The quantity and quality of lessons learned and the
ability of the organization to absorb and use these lessons is also a key component of system
safety effectiveness.
3.1.1.8 Hazardous event (incident) earning and corrective action
The objective of this sub model is to capture the dynamics associated with the handling and
resolution of safety-related anomalies and hazardous events. It is one of the most complex sub
models, reflecting the complexity of the cognitive and behavioral processes involved in
identifying, reporting, investigating, and resolving safety issues. Once integrated into the
combined model, the amount and quality of learning achieved through the investigation and
resolution of safety problems impacts the effectiveness of system safety efforts and the quality of
resulting corrective actions, which in turn has a significant effect on the technical risk of the
system.
The structure of this model revolves around the processing of incidents or hazardous events,
from their initial identification to their eventual resolution. The number of safety-related
incidents is a function of the technical risk. Some safety-related problems will be reported while
others will be left unreported. The fraction of safety problems reported depends on the
effectiveness of the reporting process, the employee sensitization to safety problems, the possible
fear of reporting if the organization discourages it, perhaps due to the impact on schedule.
Problem reporting will increase if employees see that their concerns are considered and acted
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upon, that is, if they have previous experience that reporting problems led to positive actions.
The reported problem also varies as a function of the perceived safety of the system by engineers
and technical workers. A problem reporting positive feedback loop creates more reporting as the
perceived risk increases, which is influenced by the number of problems reported and addressed.
Numerous studies have shown that the risk perceived by engineers and technical workers is
different from high-level management perception of risk. In our model, high-level management
and engineers use different cues to evaluate risk and safety, which results in very different
assessments.
A fraction of the anomalies reported are investigated in the model. This fraction varies based on
the resources available, the overall number of anomalies being investigated at any time, and the
thoroughness of the investigation process. The period of time the investigation lasts will also
depend on these same variables.
Once a hazard event or anomaly has been investigated, four outcomes are possible: (1) no action
is taken to resolve the problem, (2) a corrective action is taken that only addresses the symptoms
of the problem, (3) a corrective action is performed that addresses the root causes of the problem,
and (4) the proposed corrective action is rejected, which results in further investigation until a
more satisfactory solution is proposed. Many factors are used to determine which of these four
possible outcomes results, including the resources available, the schedule pressure, the quality of
hazardous event or anomaly investigation, the investigation and resolution process and reviews,
and the effectiveness of system safety decision-making. As the organization goes through this
ongoing process of problem identification, investigation, and resolution, some lessons are
learned, which may be of variable quality depending on the investigation process and
thoroughness. In our model, if the safety personnel and decision-makers have the capability and
resources to extract and internalize high-quality lessons from the investigation process, their
overall ability to identify and resolve problems and do effective hazard mitigation will be
enhanced.
3.1.1.9 Perceived success by high-level management
The purpose if this sub model is to capture the dynamics behind the success of the Shuttle
program as perceived by high-level management and NASA administration. The success
perceived by high-level management is a major component of the Pushing the Limit reinforcing
loop, where much will be expected from a highly successful program, creating even higher
expectations and performance pressure. High perceived success also creates the impression by
high-level management that the system is inherently safe and can be considered operational, thus
reducing the priority of safety, which affects resource allocation and system safety status. Two
main factors contribute to the perception of success: the accumulation of successful launches
positively influences the perceived success while the occurrence of accidents and mishaps have a
strong negative influence.
3.2 Model customization
The original Columbia model was essentially unchanged, but some modifications were made to
provide a better user experience or to add new capabilities. These are described below.
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3.2.1.1 Discrete resources vs. one "Safety Resource"
The Phase I model had a single variable, "Safety Resources," that represented the combined
resources all safety-related functions. To provide the end user with more granular control, this
variable was replaced with individual resource variables for investigation, maintenance, SM&A
and staffing. A multiplier was added to keep the basic model behavior the same, but it is now
possible to investigate the effect of preferentially assigning (or removing) resources from a
particular area.
3.2.1.2 Outstanding accumulated waivers added
One of the outcomes from the ITA report [2] was the determination of several "leading
variables" that provide an indication of increasing risk in advance of risk (hence the term,
leading). The ITA model had a leading indicator, "Outstanding accumulated waivers," which is
a stock (i.e., integrated value) given by the Waiver Issuance Rate-Waiver Resolution Rate.
Since Waiver Issuance Rate was not in the Phase I report it was added to this simulation to
provide a complete list of leading indicators.
3.2.1.3 Substitution for zero values
The nature of closed loop system dynamic models is that the model will result in a null set if
many variables are set to 0, even if that is the appropriate real world value. To correct for this,
any variables that result in a null set were modified to substitute a very small number (i.e.,
0.000 1) instead, which provides the same real-world result without breaking the simulation.
3.2.1.4 Simplified model view
Another change was to create a new working view in the model that would mimic the simplified
model of Figure 3 in [7], reproduced below in Figure 3-1.
Page 34 of 118
In addition, the new simplified view has several different layers to make it easier to explore the
different loops. This is shown below (with all layers displayed)
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Figure 3-3 Simplified view from the Vensim system dynamics model
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4 Design and Implementation of a Risk Management Flight
Simulator
4.1 Overview
The application has a single main program, which is designed to provide quick access to all of
the key metrics and analysis tools. To start a simulation as user simply types a descriptive name
and presses, Start. She can then modify any of the input variables and advance the time by 6
months to see the impact on the leading risk indicators and performance indicators. Figure 4-1
shows the main program display for a sample simulation run.
Figure 4-1 Risk management program main screen
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In this example we can see the current values for several variables at time = 60 months. Clicking
the left mouse button on any variable displays an historical trend of the variable. In addition, the
user can load (display) the data from any previous run to easily compare different boundary
conditions. For example, Figure 4-2, below, is a sample trend of the leading risk indicator,
"NASA Safety Experience." The bottom line (HiContracting) and the top line (LoContracting)
bound the range of possible values for NASA Safety Experience from modifying the amount of
contracting. The middle line is the value of the variable for the current simulation run at time =
60 months.
Figure 4-2 Screen shot of a trend comparing different ratios of contracting
Another feature of the application is risk matrix display. At any time of the simulation the user
can display a severity vs. likelihood risk matrix of the 16 leading risk indicators and their
potential impact on system risk.
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Figure 4-3 Sample risk matrix display
4.2 System purpose
The software application is being developed so that NASA managers can explore and learn about
the dynamics of safety without getting bogged down in either the theory of system dynamics,
Vensim , or the specific system model developed in Vensim. This latter point is particularly
important given that the model has over 700 variables and requires several days to weeks of
study to become familiar with it.
4.2.1 Program goals
The program has the following goals:
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4.2.1.1 Enable a user to explore a simplified representation of the overall system
model.
As noted above in 4.1, we want to abstract the user from the details of the Vensim model, but we
still want them to be able to explore the basic driving forces of the model. Thus, part of this
program will require that the user have a means to easily explore a simplified model that should
be readily understandable with only a minimal understanding of system dynamics.
4.2.1.2 Enable a user unfamiliar with either system dynamics or Vensim to be able to
explore and learn from the model dynamics.
This is closely related to the previous item, but whereas 4.2.1.1 referred to a model diagram, this
program goal only requires that the user be able to interact with and learn from the underlying
model dynamics. In other words, just as they might play with a computer game such as SimCity,
the user should be able to explore and discover model behavior and rules without any need for
knowing the actual model structural details.
4.2.1.3 To develop the interface program so that it can be used (or further developed)
into a NASA risk management tool.
The requirement of developing a tool that will be used by NASA to improve system safety and
the understanding of safety concepts is the real purpose of this application. As such, it must
present risk metrics and information in terms that are familiar to NASA, as well as being
consistent with any other programmatic requirements.
4.2.2 High level functional requirements
4.2.2.1 Display relevant safety variables using a risk matrix.
The 5x5 risk matrix (see below) is a standard used within NASA for describing risk and
ascribing a relative importance. For this program the leading risk indicators and their severity
are already identified in the ITA report [2]. Since the ITA report uses a low-medium-high
severity scale, we will use a 4x3 risk matrix as opposed to a 5 x 5.
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4.2.2.2 Develop the application so that it can incorporate different scenarios.
As discussed in section 2.2.3, our goal is to enable open-ended learning through dynamic
simulation. Just as an aeronautical flight simulator can run different scenarios (e.g., poor
visibility, failed equipment, etc.) to enable learning so, too, should this application be able to run
different organizational scenarios. For example, reducing the budget while increasing launch
requirements. The program should be designed so that the user can select different scenarios and
as time "progresses" within the simulation the program will automatically input the appropriate
value(s).
4.2.2.3 Allow the user to modify system variables at different simulation time steps
The user should be able to modify selected variables at any time of the simulation and verify that
inputted values were accepted
4.2.2.4 Provide trend displays of all variables
The user should be able to easily view a trend of any available variable of its value over time
4.2.2.5 Enable a user to trace dependent variables
The user should be able to trace how a variable is used within the model
4.2.2.6 Enable a user to explore the high level model one "loop" at a time
To meet requirement 4.2.1.1 the user will be able to explore a defined high level view and take
advantage of the hidden layers property to successively show additional loops, so that she can
more easily see the relationship between the different loops.
4.2.2.7 Perform sensitivity analysis runs and displays
To simplify making test runs at different values (e.g., evaluating the results of setting a variable
to a low, medium or high value), the application should provide for an easy means to create a
linear or random sensitivity run for one or more variables and display the results along with any
other non-sensitivity runs.
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4.2.2.8 Enable a user to save and compare runs
To facilitate learning the user should be able to create descriptive names for different simulations
and compare them using the available trending tools of 4.2.2.4.
4.2.2.9 Develop the application using commonly available programming tools and
applications
To support re-use and further development by others, the application should use commonly
available programming tools, databases and other third party applications.
4.2.2.10 Develop the application so that it can be upgraded and expanded with a
minimum of rework
To the extent possible, the application should be developed so that it can be adapted to other
system models with a minimum of rework. This does not mean no work-,but a designer should
not have to start over simply due to a new model being used.
4.2.3 System limitations
4.2.3.1 Game and non-game versions of the Vensim model
To enable the user to modify variables at different times (high level requirement 4.2.2.3) we will
take advantage of a Vensim feature called "game mode." In game mode the user is able to
modify pre-defined game variables and replace the value of the variable at any time of the
simulation. Unfortunately, game mode is incompatible with Vensim's "synthsim mode" which
enables a user to modify a value and see the entire model response from the beginning to end of
the simulation. 3 Since an additional requirement is to perform sensitivity analyses (4.2.2.6), the
program needs to support running sensitivity runs with the game variables. However, a
limitation of Vensim is that a game variable cannot be used as a sensitivity variable. Therefore,
3 Fundamentally, game mode lets you step through the model one time period at a time and modify variables along
the way to see how the model will subsequently respond. Synthsim mode views the simulation as a whole and does
not let the user arbitrarily change values at any number of time steps.
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we need to have two similar versions of the model: one with defined game variables (for game
mode) and another with the same variables defined as simple constants (non gaming).
4.2.3.2 Inability to easily transition between game mode and "synthsim" mode
Game mode and synthsim are two different operational modes of Vensim and cannot be
displayed simultaneously.
4.2.3.3 Single user play
This version of the program does not support multi-user play. However, Vensim supports this
and the application could be modified at a future date to support it.
4.2.4 System constraints & requirements
4.2.4.1 Vensim DSS
The application was developed with the full version of Vensim ("Vensim DSS") using the free
MIT license for academic use. It has not been tested with other versions of Vensim (i.e., Vensim
PLE).
4.2.4.2 Minimum 1024x768 display screen
The minimum display resolution is 1024x768, but 1280x1024 is preferred.
4.2.4.3 Microsoft Windows and required Windows components
This application was developed to run on the Microsoft Windows operating system. It was
designed and tested on Windows XP Professional Service Pack 2. The user does not need a
license for Microsoft Access @ for the application to read and write to the scenario database, but
they will need to have the Microsoft Data Access Components (MDAC) v2.7 or above. MDAC
is commonly installed with many COTS applications, and is also downloadable from
http://msdn.microsoft.com/data/mdac/downloads/default.aspx. The English MDAC install is
also included with the risk management installation program.
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4.2.4.4 Application support for MS COM-based DLL's
This application extensively uses the Vensim dynamic link library (DLL). Because the Windows
.NET programming platform (C#, VB.Net, etc.) has limited support for COM based DLLs in
"native mode," the application was developed using Visual Basic v6.
4.3 System design principles
4.3.1 Description
The high level diagram of the system major components is shown below in Figure 4-4. This
specification refers primarily to the user interface portion of the diagram, although various
modifications had to be made to the Vensim model to provide the gaming interface and some
additional capabilities.
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Operator
User Interface (Visual Basic)
Vensim DLL
Interface Scenario
Database
(MS Access)
System Dynamics Model
(Vensim)
Figure 4-4 High level component diagram of risk management tool
4.3.2 System components
4.3.2.1 Vensim Models
As discussed in section 4.2.3.1 we need to have two versions of the Vensim model: one with
game variables and one without.
4.3.2. 1.1 Non-game model
The non-game model is nearly identical to the original model developed by Dulac and Leveson
in [7]. The only modifications were to create greater granularity in the variable, "safety
resources" so that an operator could split budget resources between investigation, Safety and
Mission Assurance (SMA), workforce staffing and maintenance. In addition, a new view was
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created that essentially consolidates the model behavior to match the simplified diagram of the
dynamics behind the Columbia loss in Figure 1-2.
4.3.2.1.2 Game model
The game model is identical to the non-game model except that any variables that we want the
ability to modify were re-designated as gaming variables. For other than constant or lookup
variables, this is of no real consequence. However, level and dynamic (i.e., formula) variables
can also be designated as game variables, which has the effect of "turning off' their normal
dynamic behavior. The ability to override calculated results can be advantageous in instances
where one is playing a game and wants to try and "beat the system." However, since our goal
was to have a minimal impact on the normal operation of the model, we restricted gaming
variables to constants that might normally be under the (manual) control of a decision maker e.g.,
resource allocation, desired launches per year and so forth.
4.3.3 User interface
4.3.3.1 Simple display screen with all variables readily visible
The user interface should be relatively clean and uncluttered so that all meaningful information is
readily visible without requiring the user to select different buttons, tabs, pages, etc.
4.3.3.2 Extensive use of Vensim charting and display tools
To simplify development and to provide consistency between the Vensim reports and the risk
management tool, the application should utilize Vensim's graphing and charting capabilities
whenever possible. This will also eliminate the need for a 3rd party graphing and charting tool.
4.3.4 Software reuse through modularity
A primary functional requirement is for the program to be adaptable to other system dynamic
models (4.2.1.3). While the application does not fully meet this goal, it does have some of the
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basic underpinnings through the use of an Access database to store different scenarios and
eventually the ability to redefine system variables.
4.3.4.1 Microsoft Access ® database for scenario configuration
An Access database will be used to store scenario names, variables and when their values are
updated. In addition the database should provide a short description to accompany each change
so that the operator can be informed about the updated value.
4.3.4.2 Microsoft Access database for Vensim integration (Not implemented)
The access database should provide tables that define the model variable names, types,
descriptions, limits, where they should be displayed on the user interface and other simulation
parameters as later determined. (The functions and methods necessary to implement this feature
were not implemented for this thesis, but several test cases proved that the idea could be further
developed and implemented.)
4.3.5 Object-oriented design
4.3.5.1 Extensive use of class-based design to minimize programming
The application should use classes where they can reduce the programming and debugging in
this current application.
4.3.6 Rapid development environment
4.3.6.1 Microsoft Visual Basic v6
As noted in the section 4.2.4.4, Microsoft .NET programming environment does not always
"play nice" with COM-based DLLs and past experience has shown (painfully) that legacy
application interoperability is best developed with a legacy development environment. Since
Visual Basic 6 is significantly easier and faster to develop a graphical user interface (GUI) than
Visual C/C++, and all of the Vensim program examples are provided in either VB or VC
notation, this application was developed in Visual Basic v6 with the latest service packs.
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4.3.6.2 Microsoft Access
Microsoft Access was chosen as the database layer due to wide support and availability.
4.3.7 Integration with Vensim C
The application will integrate with Vensim using the vendor's proprietary dynamic link library
(DLL) interface.
4.3.8 A risk matrix for leading risk indicators
The application will provide a means for displaying all leading indicators using a 4 x 3
(likelihood vs. severity) matrix. Note that the severity is fixed for each variable from reference
[2] and consequently it can only move up or down in likelihood.
4.4. Black box behavior
4.4.1. Scenario control
The user will be presented with a combo box that will be populated with a short description from
the scenario database. With each time step the application will query the database for any
variables that need to be updated and write the appropriate values to the model. Additionally, the
program will display any associated message with the updated variable as well as a history of
changes.
4.4.2. Save & compare user runs
The application will provide a space for the user to enter a descriptive name for each run of the
program. When a new game/run is started the user will be prompted for any additional runs that
he would like to have displayed alongside the current run's data. For example, if investigating
the effect of contracting, he might call one run "High Contracting" and another "Low
Contracting" so that the effect of each can be readily compared against each other or other runs.
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4.4.3. Modify input variable values
The user will be able to modify the value of the defined input variables throughout the game. To
validate that the model accepted a value, the program will query Vensim for the current value
immediately after it is written and display the returned result.
4.4.4. Display graphs of variables over time
The user will be able to display a graph of any variable by clicking with the left mouse button
one time on the textbox or label that displays the value of the variable. There will be no limit to
the number of variables displayed.
4.4.5. Rescale, refresh and keep graphs on top
The user will be able to resize any trend display by simply dragging the trend display window to
make it larger. Because more than one graph may be displayed and to allow the user to follow
the specific behavior of a variable as the simulation progresses, the user will be able to keep a
graph on top of other windows and easily refresh the displayed data.
4.4.6. Display graphs from the Vensim model
The user will be able to list and display any predefined graphs in the Vensim model. These
graphs will have the same capabilities as described in 4.4.5.
4.4.7. Explore variable dependencies
The user will be able to "walk" the dependency tree of any of the model variables to see how
they are used within the model. This display will not use the Vensim "uses" or "depends" trees
as their similarity to fault-event trees may lead to confusion. The dependencies should be
displayed using a Windows "tree" (i.e., Microsoft Windows Explorer interfaced) to preclude this
confusion and to present the information in a familiar context. The dependency screen will have
the same capabilities as described in 4.4.5.
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4.4.8. Perform sensitivity analyses
Vensim DSS has the ability to modify one or more variables as functions and display the
accumulated results as a sensitivity analysise.g., Ramp a variable from 1 to 100 and execute the
model at each step to show model behavior as the value increases. The application will provide
for a similar capability, but will limit the user to only a linear ramp or Gaussian function. The
user will be able to select one or more variables to modify, the range of modification and, if more
than one will be modified, their order. Once the sensitivity run is completed the user will then be
able to display the sensitivity run along with any other loaded runs simultaneously. These
sensitivity graphs will have the same capabilities as described in 4.4.5.
4.4.9. Load & save configuration data to disk
The user will be able to load and save the program parameters such as the scenario database
name, Vensim model name and path, and other parameters to disk using .INI files. When the
program is closed any modified parameters will be written to disk.
The sensitivity analyses variable configuration will be saved and retrieved using the specific
.VSC or .LST Vensim file formats.
4.4.10.Register missing Vensim entries
It was discovered before starting development of the program that a bug in the Vensim DLL
install does not create the proper Windows Registry entries for DLL-based applications to run.
Therefore, to facilitate installing and running the program on other machines, the application will
check to see if the DLL entry is appropriately entered and create the entry if missing.
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4.4.11.Display and explore simplified model
The user will be able to show the high-level schematic view of 4.2.2.6 with a slider-type control
to show each of the hidden layers successively. This display will also let the user zoom in and
out, fit the graph to the display, and resize the window.
4.4.12.Display updated risk consequence-severity matrix over time
4.4.12.1 Determine likelihood level
As noted in section 4.2.2.1, the severity level is fixed from the ITA report [2] as low, medium or
high. However, there is not a clear definition of "likelihood" and this is later discussed as an
area for further research. For this software, likelihood was determined by looking at each
leading indicator and applying a logical test to come up with a likelihood function. For some
variables, this is straightforward-e.g., "fraction of launches delayed for safety" is a leading
indicator that maps from 0 tol and an increasing value corresponds with greater risk.4 But,
others, such as the "average quality of completed investigations," are more complicated because
they do not map from 0 tol and increasing quality corresponds with lesser risk, not greater. In
this case, the likelihood effect function was given by the function, "1 - average quality of
completed investigations". The logic diagram for determining each variable's likelihood
function is shown below.
4As with many dynamic models, the assumption that the import of a variable scales from one extreme to the other
does not hold up well at the boundaries. For example, if 0 launches are delayed due to safety then it may be an
indicator of a severely broken safety system and if 100% of the launches are delayed then the safety system may be
working (to prevent launches), but clearly there are significant safety issues resulting in the cancellation of all
flights.
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Logic to determine Likelihood
variable
oes the variable N
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Is there a dependent' N
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describes effect on risk
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Yes-
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Subtract variable
from 1
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Figure 4-5 Logic diagram to determine the severity function for the severity-likelihood matrix
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Table 4-1 Leading indicators and associated likelihood functions (From the ITA report [2].)
System Safety Knowledge and
Ratio
Skill Ettect of System Safety Knowledge and Skill Ratio on
System Safety E&E
Average Nasa Safety experience Effect of Nasa ability to perform oversight ratio on Safety
E&E
Amount and effectiveness of Amount and effectiveness of crossboundary communication
crossboundary communication
Effect of level of safety skill training Effect of level of safety skill training
Investigation
Incidents Under Investigation Incident Investigation Workload
Fraction of incidents investigated 1 - fraction of incidents investigated
Reported Incidents 1 - Fraction of Safety Incidents Reported
Quality of Safety Analyses
Quality of Incident Investigation 1 - Quality of Incident Investigation
Quality of completed investigations 1 - average quality of completed investigations
Normalized Quality and Quantity of Effect of Root Cause Incident Learning Value on System
lessons learned Safety E&E
Quality of Incident Investation
Time to complete investigation Time to complete investigation - normal time to complete
investigation
Incident Investigation Workload Incident Investigation Workload
Fraction of incidents receiving action that Effect of Corrective Actions adressing Systemic Factors on
receive systemic action Risk
Power and Authority of Safety Authorir ,
Fraction of Safety Incidents Reported 1 - Fraction of Safety Incidents Reported
Fraction of corrective actions rejected by Fraction of corrective actions rejected by review panel
review panel
Fraction of launches delayed for system Fraction of launches delayed for system safety
safety I
Note: These are the actual variable names and any apparent typographical errors merely represent the naming
convention used in the model
In addition to determining the likelihood function the value must then be mapped onto one of
four levels: improbable, remote, infrequent, and probable. 5 In a PRA-centric approach, the
attribution of a risk to likelihood level is a simple matter of choosing even breakpoints. But, as
noted earlier, an area of further research is developing a consistent scale for all of the leading
variables. Until then, trial and error indicated that the following break points result in a good
distribution of likelihoods.
5 This terminology follows the NASA convention to make the results more familiar to NASA managers, but their
adaptation from a hardware/system failure domain to a leading risk indicator domain is a bit problematic. Given the
qualitative nature of the system dynamics model it may be more appropriate to use terms that reflect the degree of
focus that should be devoted to a particular area to address safety concerns. E.g., "Immediate attention required",
"long-term problem that should be addressed soon", "long-term problem that should be addressed", and "no long
term or immediate safety concerns"
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Table 4-2 Likelihood classification break points
Likelihood Classification Value range
Improbable < 0.33
Remote > 0.33 and < 0.66
Infrequent > 0.66 and < 1
Probable >1.1
4.4.12.2 Risk matrix display functions
Each of the defined leading indicators is mapped to a 4x3 risk matrix to show the changing
likelihood of each variable at different time sequences. Each time the user refreshes the display
the system keeps the previous value for each variable in memory and lets the user toggle between
the previous and current value to more readily see any transitions.
To display each variable, the risk matrix has a 12-square grid with the outer levels in green, the
inner levels in yellow and the top right (most severe, highest likelihood) in red. On top of each
square will be displayed a number corresponding to a leading indicator listed to the right of the
matrix.
To facilitate self-directed investigation, double-clicking on a leading indicator (in the list box)
displays that variable's trend display screen.
4.4.13.Step model forward in time (user configurable)
The application has an easy method for the user to step the model forward in time by a
configurable time period (default = 6 months) until the end of the simulation.
4.4.14.Context-sensitive help
Context-sensitive such as "tool tips" are available throughout the program to assist the user. An
on-line help document was not developed for this version of the program.
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4.4.15.Display leading risk indicator values
The main display screen groups the leading risk indicators (see Table 4-1) by functional area on
the main display screen. The displayed values are automatically updated with each step forward
in model time.
4.4.16.Notify user of an "accident"
The Vensim model has an accumulating risk function that simulates an accident when the
number of launches equals the risk function. This event is clearly indicated to the user to inform
him that the accumulated risk has reached an unsafe level.
4.4.17.Log error messages to disk
The application has an error logging function to write errors to disk with a timestamp and short
description of the error.
4.5. Logical functions
The high-level main program operation is described in this section.
4.5.1 Class definitions
4.5.1.1 Vensim class structure
The Vensim class is the core object for this application. An instance of the class is created for
each model variable that is displayed and added to a class collection. In addition to reading and
writing values to the Vensim model, the class is responsible for trending, dependency lists,
calculating the likelihood function for a variable, and updating all user controls. One particularly
nice aspect of the class that simplifies the program code is that any label or text box that displays
the variable value is assigned to that class's instance so that the class can subscribe to the object
for any events such as a mouse click event and respond appropriately. Thus, the main display
form has very little code and is easier to troubleshoot and modify.
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Figure 4-6 Vensim class function overview
4.5.1.2 Windows INI class
The Windows INI class handles all registry and INI read/write operations. In addition to loading
and saving user configuration data the class also updates the registry if the Vensim DLL was not
properly installed (4.4.10).
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Public Properties
GameVariable (Bool)
PicFormCollection (Collection)
EffectOnSystemSafetyVariable (String)
Severity (AccidentSeverityLevel)
LeadingVariable (Bool)
IsPercent (Bool)
VariableName (String)
Public Functions
AddControl (Form Control)
PlotVariableo
GetVenGraph (Graphname)
SetValue (Value as Single)
GetValue(Val as Single) as Bool
GetEffectOnSS( as Single
Private Functions
AddFormToCollection (WinForm)
GetFormValueo as Single
UpdateFormControls( Val as Single)
HandleErroro
Object Events
LabelMouseDownO
ProgressBarMouseDown()
TextBoxDoubleClicko
ClassInitializeO
ClassTerminateO
Figure 4-7 Windows INI class overview
4.5.1.3 Error handling class
The error handling class writes error and infonnational messages to disk.
Figure 4-8 Error handling class overview
4.5.2 Program initialization
Program initialization includes reading user settings from the INI file, checking and fixing the
registry (this would only happen once as once fixed the registry is not written to again),
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Private Properties
GetlNIFileNameO as String
Public Functions
ModifyRegistryValue()
EnumRegistryBranches()
EnumRegistryValues()
OperRegistryKey()
CloseRegistryKey()
ReadRegValue(
WriteRevValueo
Read NIValueO
WritelNIValue
Private Functions
GetString From ByteArray(
Private Properties
LogDirectory() as String
LogFileName( as String
Public Functions
LogError(Err, Msg as String)
LogEvent(Msg as String)
Private Functions
LogData(
MakeLogDirectory()
Object Events
ClassInitialize()
initializing the Vensim classes and connecting to the scenario database. A high level overview is
shown below.
Initialize Program
Start
Load INI File
Check registry key
Connect to Access
DB
Initialize Vensim 
-
Classes
.IzziTzI
Assign labels and
other form controls
to the cVensim
Class
Load scenarios List
Display Main Form Access
Initialize Vensim Classes
| For each variable...
Create
cVensim Class
Set:
Variable Name
If a Gaming variable
If value is percent
Effect on safety
function
Leading indicator of
risk Bool
Severity Level
V Add to Class Conection
Figure 4-9 High level overview - Program initialization
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Get INI Values
Create cINI Class
For each INI Value:
ModelName
Sensitivity Model Name
Default Database Name
User Name
Initial Directory
Set Value from
ciNI.ReadValueo
Destroy Class
J
W
4.5.3 Start simulation
A new simulation starts by the user entering a name for the simulation run and pressing the
'Start' button. The program resets the scenario database and then prompts the user to load (i.e.
display) any additional runs at the same time. Finally, the main window form is updated with the
initial values for all display and user input values. A high level overview is shown below.
Press Start
Get run name
Reset Scenario
Variables to Unread
Load model Access
SSet Game mode 
sn
List run names to
display
Reset form
variales 
-Get Values from Vensim
Step wd bytimeFor each class in the
interval Vensim Class Collection
Get values from
Vensim Public Functions
GetValue(Val as Single) as Bool
Private Functions
UpdateFormControls( Val as Single)
Update main form
displayed values
Figure 4-10 High level overview - starting a new simulation run
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4.5.4 Advance simulation
To advance the simulation the user enters a new time step if desired and presses the 'Advance
Time' button. The program writes user input values to Vensim, retrieves updated values for all
variables and writes values from the scenario database. In addition, an "accident" message is
displayed if there was an accident as defined in the model. A high level overview is shown
below.
Advance Time -Write Values to Vensim
For each class in the
Write user input to Vensim Class Collection
Vensim
, Pulblic Functions
Set time advance SetValue(Val as Single)
interval
Advance model by
time interval
-Get Values from Vensim
Get values from For each class in the
Vensim Vensim Class Collection
Check for Public Functions
"accident" and GetValue(Val as Single) a
display mesage Private Functions
UpdateFormControls( Val
Write scenario
database values to]
Vensim
Update main form
displayed values
Ac essDisplay scenario
messages to user
Figure 4-11 High level overview - advance simulation
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as Single)
M
4.5.5 Trend/Sensitivity/Dependent variable display
The variable trend display, sensitivity plot and dependency tree share the same form object
because they share many of the same methods. By selecting the appropriate option button, the
trend updates to show the selected display. Because the application uses the Vensim plotting
methods, it was discovered that if a trend was resized that it was necessary to have Vensim
recalculate the trend with the updated picture dimensions. Hence, whenever the form is resized
it instructs Vensim to refresh the data.
To manage memory and to ensure an easy program termination, each instance of a form is
managed in a global forms collection.
In addition, the form takes advantage of some Windows API function calls to provide the option
of making it the top-most form on the Windows desktop. This feature makes it possible to keep
a trend displayed continuously as the simulation is updated.
A schematic diagram of the program flow for the trend display window is shown below in Figure
4-12.
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Displav Trend/Sensitivitv/Deoendent Variables
Events that display form
A
Click label on form Double click variable in Display custom graphRisk Matrix form from Model
New form
Public Functions Part of instance
PlotVariable() Cls
| d omtforms c llection
SGet positions of controls(for relative resizing)
Graph type = Graph
Refresh data
Graph typeh
SniiiyGraph
I/
User resizes form
Re-scale trend display
Reposition object
positions
Refresh data
Terinate fo
Delete form from collection
Figure 4-12 High level diagram of the trend, sensitivity and model dependency tree
4.5.6 Risk matrix form
The risk matrix form maps the leading indicators listed in Table 4-1 to a 4x3 likelihood vs.
severity matrix (discussed in Section 4.4.12.2). Upon being loaded, the form iterates through the
cVensim class collection to find the classes with the Leading Variable property = TRUE. For
each leading variable it adds it to the list box and calls the Severity and GetEffectonSS functions
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Graph type option button
Select Display Tree
Variable Tree view
Sen vityGet next
dependent .
Select Graph Yes
User Click on
Next variable
No
FNo actionLI
I I
to get the severity and likelihood, respectively. It then displays the associated variable number in
the corresponding likelihood-severity grid coordinate.
When the form is refreshed, it re-queries the class for the updated likelihood value and histories
the previous value so that the two can be easily compared.
Load the Risk Matrix Form
Load form
IZZEI.
User refreshes data
Call refresh data
I-
For each class in
cVensim Collection
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User selects risk matrix
button on main form
Refresh data
Replace last value with
current values
I
Publix Properties
Severity
Public Functions
GetEffectOnSSO
Leadin g
variable
Yes
Severity=
Likelihood=
Add to leading variable
list box
I
-A
---- -....... ..  ... .  .. ....... .. ---------- -  .....  ... - -   .
I
|
4.5.7 Show model
Selecting the show model button displays a high level view of the system dynamics model as
described in 4.2.2.6. The form displays the Vensim view, "Simplified View" and displays the
first layer of the view with a single loop. A slider bar is available for the user to show and hide
successive loops adding and hiding complexity as needed to help her explore the basic model
relationships.
There is also a "show behavior" option that implements the "synthsim" mode of Vensim to
display small behavior trends for each variable in the model.
4.5.8 User configuration
The user configuration is accessible by selecting Configuration- Select model or
Configuration- 4Game Database from the program title bar. The select model option opens a
dialog wherein the user can browse and select the game and non-game versions of the Vensim
model. (Refer to section 4.2.3.1).
The select database option lets the user browse and select the access database for the scenario
database.
Upon exiting the program, the selected user values are written to the .INI file.
4.5.9 Instructions
The user will be able to display basic instructions (read from the scenario database) by selecting
Help-*Instructions from the program title bar.
4.6. Scenario database
4.6.1 Table structure
4.6.1.1 Venvariables
The Venvariables table stores the information to be written to Vensim for all of the scenarios.
Page 63 of 118
Table 4-3 Scenario database Venvariables table structure
VenVariables TaIle
Field Name Description Data type
ID Unique index for each field Long Integer
Variablename The name of the Vensim model variable String
ShortDesc A short description of the variable String
WhatHappened Memo to be displayed to operator. Has <Var1> Memo (long string)
and <Var2> place holders to substitute values
ElapsedTime The number of time units (i.e. months) that this Integer
value is to be written
TimeEnd <not used>
Varl The value to be written to Vensim. May also be Single
displayed to operator in memo
Var2 A Value to be displayed to the operator, but not Single
written to Vensim. (can be used to express
cleaner units such as 4 launches/yr vs. 0.333
launches/month)
Inactive Flag set by program when variable has been Boolean
processed
4.6.1.2 Scenarios
The scenarios table holds all of the scenario descriptions.
Table 4-4 Scenario database Scenarios table structure
Scenarios Table
Field Name Description Data type
ScenariolD Unique index for each field Long Integer
Scenario A short description of the scenario to be displayed String
I by program
Description A longer descriptive field String
4.6.1.3 Scenario2Variable
The Scenario2Variable table is a one-to-many map of the Scenarios table to the VenVariables
table. In addition to minimizing the chance of error when associating an entry in the
VenVariables table with a scenario, it also enables us the re-use entries in more than one
scenario.
Table 4-5 Scenario database Scenario2Variable table structure
Scenario2Variable Table
Field Name Description Data type
ID Unique index for each VenVariables field Long Integer
ScenarioID Unique index for each Scenario field Long Integer
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4.6.1.4 Game play
The Game play table stores on-line help and informational messages. They are accessible when
selecting Help-> Instructions from the program title bar menu.
Table 4-6 Scenario database Game Play table structure
Game Play Tablk
Field Name Description Data type
ID Unique index for each field Long Integer
ShortDesc A short description indicating when the message String
is to be displayed. Presently only 'Intro'
Message Memo to be displayed to operator. Memo (long string)
TimeStart <not used> <not used>
TimeEnd <not used> <not used>
Varl <not used> <not used>
Var2 <not used> <not used>
4.6.2 Table relationships diagram
Figure 4-13 Scenario database table relationships diagram
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4.7. Implementation
4.7.1 Screen snap shots
4.7.1.1 Main program
Figure 4-14 Screen image of main program
4.7.1.2 Sample trend
Clicking on any variable's value on the main form accesses the sample trend. The example
below shows the current simulation (short line), and two previously completed simulations: lo
contracting (top line) and hi contracting (bottom line)
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Figure 4-15 Screen image of variable trend display
4.7.1.3 Variable tree
The variable tree option button lets the user explore how the variable is used in the model.
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Figure 4-16 Screen image of variable dependency tree
4.7.1.4 Sensitivity control
The sensitivity control lets the user select which variables should be modified and the order of
simulation. The user then saves and runs the sensitivity to view the results.
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I
Figure 4-17 Screen image of sensitivity configuration
4.7.1.5 Sensitivity display
The sensitivity display shows the range of possible values for a variable from the simulation.
Shaded sections indicate which portion of the runs fell within a confidence bound (i.e., the
bottom shaded portion indicates a 75% confidence that values won't exceed that band.).
Additionally, three other loaded runs are visible as well. The top dark line is the boundary for
the low contracting run, the bottom dark line is the boundary for the high contracting run, and
finally the short gray line that in the first quartile indicates that the current example run has a
particularly high number of NASA employees.
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Figure 4-18 Screen image of sensitivity plot
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4.7.1.6 Risk matrix 
The risk matrix displays the leading variables and where they fall on the likelihood-severity 
matrix . 
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Figure 4-19 Screen image of risk matrix display 
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4.7.1.7 Show model
Figure 4-20 Screen image of high level model with one loop (layer) displayed
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Figure 4-21 Screen image of high level model with three loops (layers) displayed 
5 System Evaluation & Testing 
I 
To help determine the effectiveness of this software as well as to get user feedback, three MIT 
graduate student volunteers were solicited to use the risk management simulator. They were 
given a short introduction (about 30 minutes) into the basic operation of the tool and a very high 
overview of the NASA model and system dynamics. 
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Sample test scenarios
Simulating high and low contacting ratios
In this scenario the users are asked to explore the impact of contracting on system safety. They
should discover that a high contracting ratio leads to higher risk and an accident sooner than low
contracting. The participant is then asked the following:
* Is there a difference between high contracting and low contracting on system safety?
The student should notice that high contracting results in a higher risk and an accident much
sooner than with low contracting
0 What is the root cause?
In both cases (high and low contracting) the total safety staff size (NASA and contractors)
and knowledge are about the same (even though individually there are very different), so it is
not immediately apparent why contracting has such a strong impact on safety. The goal is to
see if the student is able to discover that the high risk and accident rate is driven primarily by
NASA's much smaller ability to oversee contracting work ("Nasa ability to perform
oversight ratio" in the Vensim model).
Simulating performance pressure through launch requirements
There are two ways to control the launch rate in the model. The user can change either the
yearly launch goal or the administrative safety limit. Think of the former as the goal that is set at
the beginning of the year and the latter as a stop check on system safety that can be applied at
any time. By setting these values appropriately, one can create nearly identical launch rates (i.e.
2 per year), but with very different safety results. The participant is then asked the following:
0 Is there a difference between the two launch scenarios on system safety?
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The student should notice that when the desired launch rate is set much lower than the upper
limit so that risk is very low and that there are no accidents, however, when the two values
are reversed and the desired launch rate is much higher than the max allowed that risk is
higher and an accident occurs.
* What is the root cause?
This is a problem that, at first, seems very confusing. The average launch rate is almost the same
and all other values are fixed; yet there is a very clear difference in safety. The goal is to see if
the student is able to discover that the much greater performance pressure drives the higher risk
and accident rate.
Test results
* The test was administered to three graduate MIT students. From observations and post-
test discussion it became clear that the simplified interface of the simulator program still
presents the novice student with too much information. The potential for confusion is
lessened significantly if the student works through a sample case with the test
administrator to gain familiarity with the tool and to learn some investigation techniques.
This both shortened the total test time and exposed the student to an additional test
scenario on safety dynamics. It also seemed that the student that worked through a
sample case first enjoyed the experience more, had greater confidence using the tool and
seemed to have greater depth of understanding of the system dynamics.
Test observations
* Students found it useful and informative to have an overview of the Vensim model and
the purpose of the simulation tool, but it did not make it any easier to solve the cases
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" It was immensely useful to first work through a problem with a student so that they can
see how to use the tool and possible strategies
" For initial training it may be useful to have a simplified display screen with only a few
variables and trends so that students can immediately see how the model operates
* Maximum learning occurs through collaboration with a test administrator. The student is
able to ask questions about the model, and can get hints if he appears to get stuck.
" The case question approach (i.e., why safety changes with contracting) appears to be a
very good method for teaching basic system behaviors and how to use the leading
indicators.
* The risk matrix was of no value to the test participants
" The sensitivity analysis was useful at the conclusion of a test during discussion to explain
and show the model behavior, but was confusing if used as a diagnostic tool (but this
could be due to the students' unfamiliarity with the tool and greater use could change
this.)
" One student suggested that he would have found it very beneficial if the tool could
indicate somehow (i.e., via color) which variables/leading indicators had the most
divergent values for different test runs to help him focus his attention on the most
important variables.
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Case-based learning model
Based upon student test results a "case method" can be a very instructive method for teaching
system safety concepts with the risk management tool. A suggested flow chart for case-based
learning is based upon Figure 7.1 in [18] and is shown below.
Practice Case Administrator's Input
" Create bounding test runs and display
data
* Ask leading questions on behavior, but
show where to find information to
minimize confusion
" Discuss behavior from model diagram
perspective
" Discuss how leading indicators could
have been used in the treal world"
Actual Case Administrator's Input
Help if stuck
Help with tool & program
Leading questions where needed
System dynamics * Overview of system dynan
overview Very high level overview of
underlying system dynami
Introduction to the * Description of functions
simulation tool j How to modify, view result,
Practice case study Instructor picks case to wothrough together
Discussion and * Review performance
suggestions * Lessons learned
Actual test case Instructor briefs student onobjectives
Discussion of results I Lessons learned
& performance a How to apply to real world
un an
additional Reflection & discussion
case?
<ydiinl 
o- 
efeto 
dsuso
ics
the
:s model
rk
goaIs &
Figure 5-1 Case-based learning flow chart for teaching users system safety concepts using the risk
management tool. (Based upon Figure 7.1 of [181
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a
6 Conclusions and Recommendations
6.1. Discussion of thesis goals
Test takers confirmed that they found the simplified model diagram useful for visualizing the
basic system loops and interactions. Color-coding the loops and a adding loops one step at a
time also helped with their comprehension.
Enable a user unfamiliar with either system dynamics or Vensim to be able to
explore and learn from the model dynamics.
The user interface was designed to display model variables and user controls in a familiar
Microsoft Windows context. While not a design goal - the fact that they found the simulation
"fun" kept them engaged and interested as well. It was originally thought that the tool would be
given to a user with a very general goal such as "minimize risk without reducing launch rate",
but preliminary testing suggests that this goal is too advanced for a novice. The simplified
interface still has too much information and it is too easy to become overwhelmed. On the other
hand, the case method appears to be very instructive for creating a well-defined problem that
leads to an understanding of basic safety concepts as well as a springboard for further discussion.
6.2. Conclusions
It appears that practically every high-risk endeavor that works with complex systems has some
kind of training or modeling simulator available. From flight simulators to product marketing
simulations, if a bad decision can lead to the loss of life or severe financial loss, there is likely to
be a simulator available to help train people how to make the right decision. This is especially
true at NASA, where it seems that practically every evolution, from maintenance to launch
procedures is practiced repeatedly to minimize any chance of a mistake. With one glaring
exception: there is presently no simulator available to help managers to make informed
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decisions to minimize system risk. The goal of this thesis is to bridge this gap and bring risk
simulation programmatic decision-making and resource allocation. Based upon the student
testing and feedback the software application has made significant inroads towards developing a
dynamic risk management flight simulator. Students reported that after using the software for
only a short period they had a better intuitive understanding of the system dynamics underlying
the safety culture at NASA. For example, when working through the contractor case, none of
the students had previously considered the importance of "contractor oversight" on safety when
increasing the number of contractors involved with a project. This was in spite of the fact that
they were experienced engineers with an average work experience of about 10 years each. With
further development (discussed below) as well as additional user testing with NASA managers
the risk management simulator can significantly help to train people about systemic risk and
provide NASA with a powerful tool for risk analysis.
6.3. Suggested future work
6.3.1. Calibrate the model
At present, the model is entirely theoretical based upon our understanding of NASA, its policies
and procedures and staff interviews. However, as with all computer models, there are numerous
assumptions with respect to the size and scale of input variables as well as the model response to
some inputs. While this may not change the overall behavior, the lack of "real numbers" will
cause NASA managers to be distrustful of any model results. Using real historical values and
comparing the model results to the known data for the same time and values can rectify this.
This is called, "calibrating a model" and results in a model that can accurately predict past
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events. As with all models, the ability to predict future events off of past data is dubious 6, but
the greater correlation with real values would still be an asset.
6.3.2. Dynamic risk matrix "what if' analysis
It is our hope that the likelihood-severity matrix will be a popular tool by NASA. Late in its
development, it was realized how eminently useful it would be if a user could dynamically
explore the actions available to reduce the likelihood of a particular indicator (recall that the
severity is fixed in this model) i.e., if a particular indicator had a high likelihood the user should
be able to use a slider bar or other tool to modify one or more model variables to see which
one(s) can reduce the likelihood. Right now a user can either make a change and step forward in
time (which is a different risk calculation since time is modified), or he can stop and restart the
simulation and modify one or more values to see how the matrix has changed. Neither one of
these is very dynamic and make it hard for user to explore in real-time e.g.,, "...OK, I'm in a
pickle with this variable... let's see what I can move around to reduce this likelihood"
6.3.3. Live on-line risk management simulator
Once the model is calibrated the next logical step would be to provide a direct import of real data
in near real-time. As opposed to a training simulator, NASA managers could potentially have an
on-line risk management tool using real data. Not only would NASA personnel have greater
trust and faith in a system using their data, but also the promise of a risk management flight
simulator with real data would fundamentally change the safety decision process for NASA
management and hopefully help to prevent future space flight disasters.
6 As the late sports commentator Yogi Berra would say, " It's tough to make predictions, especially about the future"
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Appendices
A.1. System Dynamics Model Sub Model Views
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Figure A.1.8 Safety knowledge, skills and staffing sub model 
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A.2. Manned Space Program Risk Management Tool User
Manual
A.2.1 Introduction
Thank you for using the Manned Space Program Risk Management tool.
This application provides an easy-to-use interface to a system model developed in Vensim @,
which simulates the NASA safety culture prior to the Columbia Shuttle accident in 2003. With
this software you are able to make resource allocation and mission decisions throughout a
twelve-year time span and evaluate their impact on key performance and leading risk indicators.
You can use this application in a variety of ways. For example, you may just want to explore the
basic system dynamics, or you may have a specific goal, such as how to maximize the shuttle
launch rate while minimizing risk and the possibility of an accident. Regardless, we hope that
you find the application educational, fun and useful.
This user manual is broken down into the following sections:
Getting started - Program prerequisites, system configuration and starting a simulation
Running a simulation - How to load and run a simulation and evaluate the results
Modifying the Vensim model - How to modify the underlying Vensim model
Advanced topics - How to use the scenario database to create new simulation scenarios as well
as customized user instructions.
Trouble-Shooting - Some common problems and their solution
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A.2.2 Getting Started
Prerequisites
Vensim DSS
The application was developed with the full version of Vensim ("Vensim DSS") using the free
MIT license for academic use. It has not been tested with other versions of Vensim (i.e., Vensim
PLE).
Minimum 1024x768 display screen
The minimum display resolution is 1024x768, but 1280x1024 is preferred.
Microsoft Windows and required Windows components
This application was developed to run on the Microsoft Windows operating system. It was
designed and tested on Windows XP Professional Service Pack 2. You do not need a license for
Microsoft Access @ to read and write to the scenario database, but you will need to have the
Microsoft Data Access Components (MDAC) v2.7 or above. MDAC is installed a part of many
other software applications, such as Microsoft Access. The MDAC install is included with the
simulation setup CD and is available at:
http://msdn.microsoft.coin/data/mdac/downloads/default.aspx
Starting the program
The installation program will create a program directory and an entry on your Windows Start
menu. Navigate to the Risk Management Tool folder and select the "Safety Game" icon to start
the program.
Overview of the risk management tool
The risk management tool provides a simplified user interface to a system dynamics model
developed in Vensim. This main program screen is shown below.
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Figure A.2-1 Main program screen of the risk management tool
Program Functions
1. Select Scenario - Select the scenario for the simulation. A scenario will
automatically modify simulation values (budget, launch requirements, and so forth) to
mimic changing external factors. Choose, "Static Resources" to for no changes
2. User name or Run Name - the descriptive name ("run name") for a simulation. It
must be entered before pressing Start. As you progress through the simulation all
calculated results are stored in a ".vdf' file with the specific run name, e.g.,
"SampleRun.vdf'
3. Start - Press start to start a new simulation. You will be prompted to select additional
runs to load at this time.
4. Advance Time - Advances the simulation time by the number of months in (5).
5. Time Step - The number of months to advance a simulation. Default is (6).
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6. Main Control Panel - The eight values below are the variables that you control during
the simulation. Note that pressing Start (3) will reset these to their initial values.
Double-click on any text block to display an historical trend of the variable.
7. Leading Risk Indicators - This group of variables are the key risk variables that you
will want to monitor for signs of increasing system risk. Clicking inside the rectangle
on a variable's value once will display an historical trend of the value.
8. Select Graph - This will display a list of graphs that are part of the Vensim model
package. Unlike the trends displayed when a variable is clicked, these graphs may
have several variables on the same display.
9. Load Runs - Each simulation run is saved under the name that you entered in (2) so
that you can easily compare values between different simulations. Press this button to
display a list of available runs to add or remove them from the simulation.
10. Sensitivity - This displays a control screen to let you create and run sensitivity
simulations.
11. Show Model - This displays a high-level overview of the system safety model, the
major loops and driving factors.
12. Risk Matrix - This displays a 3 x 4 severity-likelihood risk matrix similar to the 5x5
matrix commonly used by NASA
13. Performance Indicators - This group of variables can be useful for understanding the
model behavior, resources and monitoring the launch rate.
14. Messages - The large text area at the bottom of the screen displays the most recent
message from an active scenario and the two white boxes to the right display a history
of messages.
15. If the model predicts a shuttle accident the event is displayed here.
16. File Menu -
a. File, then Exit - Exits the application
b. Configuration - select the Vensim model and the scenario database locations
c. Help - Displays instructions from the database
System configuration
Select Vensim models
From the File menu (16) select Configuration, then Select Model. There are two Vensim models
that need to be loaded. The main model, "SafetyGame.vpm" is the model used throughout the
simulation. If you get an error message when starting the program that it can't find the model
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then you may need to update the simulation with the correct file location. The new location is
saved in the .INI file when the program closes so that you will not need to do this again.
Figure A.2-2 Load model dialog
To browse and select a different location press the ellipses button to the right and browse and
select the appropriate model as shown below.
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Figure A.2-3 Browse and select model dialog
The second option in the configuration screen is the sensitivity model location. 
This is only
needed if you will be performing sensitivity analyses. This model structure is 
the same as the
simulation model , but all of the "game variables" have been converted to constants. 
This is a
limitation of Vensim: it is unable to run a sensitivity simulation with game variables.
Select scenario database
If you get an error that the simulation tool is unable to locate the scenario database 
then you need
to browse and select the scenario database "Safety Game.mdb" file.
INI File
The "SafetyGame.ini" file, is in the same directory as the simulation program and 
stores system
and user configuration settings. The SafetyGame.ini file values are read when 
the program is
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started and any changes to the parameters are written when the program closes. If this file is
missing the simulation program will automatically create a new one with default values.
Show model
Select this button to display a simplified view of the system dynamics model. This view has
several different "layers" with each level adding another color-coded loop to show the basic
model behavior and driving loops.
Figure A.2-4 High level overview of the system dynamics model
When first opened, the model will only show a single positive feedback loop titled, "Pushing the
Limit". This shows how the perception of success by high-level management increases with
each successful launch. Moving the "Show Hidden Levels" slider to the right adds new loops
until the complete model is displayed as shown below. The "Zoom Percent" slider control lets
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you zoom in and out of the display as needed, or you can use the "Fit to Screen" checkbox to
display the whole model within the window. (Note: When "Fit to Screen" is checked the zoom
slider is disabled.) Checking "Show Behavior" will display a trend of all loaded runs for each
variable within each variable box in the window. For example, the screen shot below shows the
behavior with two scenarios loaded: high yearly launch rate (blue line) and low yearly launch
rate (red line).
Figure A.2-5 High level overview of the system dynamics model with two layers displayed and show behavior
enabled
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Figure A.2-6 High level over of the system dynamics model with all layers displayed
A.2.3 Running a simulation
Scenario selection
The simulation tool uses a scenario database that can simulate external events such as changing
budget or mission requirements. You control which scenario to run by selecting it from the list
box at (1). As you advance in time through the simulation it will check the database for any
values that need to be written to the model and display the results in the "Messages" section of
the main form.
If you do not want to any data written from the scenario database select "Static budget and
resources
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Starting a simulation
Before starting a new simulation you should type a descriptive name in the run name box 
(2) so
that the data from the simulation run can be viewed at a later date or contrasted with another 
run.
After typing a run name press Start (3). If a run with that name already exists you will be
prompted if you want to overwrite it. You are then prompted to load or remove any additional
runs as shown below.
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ExampleRun
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Figure A.2-7 Load runs configuration dialog
To load or unload a run either press the appropriate double arrow, or double-click on the 
run to
move it between boxes. You can also press the appropriate buttons to delete a previous 
model,
see the date that it was run and load a run from an alternate location. When you are 
satisfied
press Close to close the window.
The main form then updates with the starting default values for all of the user control and display
variables. Please note that this will reset any changes you have made to an input variable. 
The
simulation is at time zero.
Page 102 of 118
Advancing simulation time
The simulation runs from time = 0 months to 144 months (although this can be changed by
modifying the Vensim model and republishing it). To advance the simulation press the Advance
Time button (4). The program writes user inputs from the Main Control Panel section (6),
advances the simulation time by the number of months in the Time Step field (5) and updates the
display with the current value of the system variables.
The program also checks to see if the model predicted a shuttle "accident" and displays a
message similar to the one below if there was an accident.
accident at Time = 120 months!
Figure A.2-8 Message indicating that there has been a shuttle accident
When the simulation time reaches 144 months a dialog is displayed announcing that the "game is
over."
You can end or restart a simulation at any time by pressing the Start button.
Trending data
To display an historical trend of any model variable, left-click one time in the rectangle of any
leading or performance indicator. For user input values, double-click in the white text box of the
variable. A trend similar to the one below is displayed
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Figure A.2-9 Historical trend of a model variable
Trend display size
To make a trend larger or smaller use your left mouse button to click and drag any of the borders
to make the window larger or smaller.
Trend display controls
Graph type control options
Graph The graph radio button is the default when the form opens. Select
this option to display the a trend graph of the selected variable
Sensitivity Select the sensitivity option to display a sensitivity plot. You will
get an error if a sensitivity run is not loaded and the first run listed
in the Load Runs window. Refer to the section on sensitivity
analyses for more information
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Variable Tree Select the variable tree option to see how a variable is used
throughout the model. When first selected you will see the
variable name with a "+" sign to the left. Clicking on the + sign
displays the variables that depend on the variable as a calculation
input. You can then click on any of the newly displayed variables
to see what variables depend on them for information and so forth.
In this manner you can easily follow the flow of information in the
model.
Figure A.2-10 Variable tree display
Stay on top
Check the Stay on top check box to force the trend to be on top of all other Windows on the
desktop. This is useful if you want to monitor a particular variable over time and want the
display to be readily visible.
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Refresh
Press the Refresh button to have the trend display redrawn with the current data.
Loading other simulation runs
A key feature of the simulation tool is the ability to compare variables between different 
runs to
highlight differences. Whenever you start a new run (with a new name) the data from the
simulation is automatically saved to a file with the descriptive name that you 
gave the
simulation. To display the data from other runs press the Load Runs button and 
select the
dataset(s) to load. For example, if you wanted to investigate the effect of high and low
contracting percentages on the model you would run a simulation for each scenario, and 
then you
would load both of them as shown below.
HIiressure yii LoContracting
1 TA E xogenoum Set~ HiContracting
Launch
LaunchHiDesire
LaunchHighDesire -
LaunchLoDesire
LaunchLowDesire
Low Contractor
LowLaunchPressur l1I
Figure A.2-11 Screen shot of the load runs dialog with two data runs loaded for analysis
Now when you click on a variable to display a trend you see a different colored line for 
each data
run. Looking at the charts below, we see that, as expected, the number of contractor 
safety
employees is higher under the Hi Contracting model, but NASA's ability to oversee 
the
contractors is significantly reduced.
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IFigure A.2-12 Trend comparing the number of contractor employees under high and low contracting
scenarios
Figure A.2-13 Trend comparing NASA's ability to oversee contractors under high and low contracting
scenarios
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Risk matrix
Another key feature of the simulation tool is the likelihood vs. severity 4x3 risk matrix that is
modeled after the 5x5 matrix commonly used by NASA.. The matrix displays an indication of
the potential impact of a leading variable on system safety and risk. The severity of each of the
16 leading variables is fixed from the ITA report, but the likelihood is calculated from the system
dynamics model and varies with time. As the likelihood changes, the number corresponding to
the position of the variable in the list box is displayed in the appropriate grid positions.
Figure A.2-14 - Likelihood vs. Severity risk matrix
Likelihood - Severity form options
Show Last
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Every time you press the Refresh Data button the currently displayed data is buffered in memory
and the data is then refreshed. Press and hold the Show Last button to display the buffered
values in blue, when you release the button the current values are redisplayed. By alternating a
couple of times you can easily see any changes in the matrix.
Refresh Data
Press Refresh Data to update the matrix with the most current data. Before the matrix is updated
the old data is copied to the buffer for the Show Last button. Each time you press Refresh Data
the buffer is updated with the previous data set even if nothing has changed.
Stay on Top
Click on the Stay on Top checkbox to force the matrix display to be on top of all other window
applications.
Select graph
Select Graph displays a list box of any pre-configured graphs that are stored with the Vensim
model. Unlike the trend displays when you click on a variable, the pre-configured graphs can
show multiple variables and different graph types such as x-y graphs.
Sensitivity Analysis
Creating a sensitivity run
Sensitivity Analysis is a powerful tool that makes it easy for you to see the effect of changing a
variable incrementally or randomly without having to many simulation runs. For example,
suppose you wanted to see the effect of changing the launch rate from 0 to 12 launches per year.
You could create 13 different test runs, increasing the launch rate by 1 each time. Or, you could
run a sensitivity analysis and have the software calculate the all possible values for you and
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display the results on a sensitivity plot. A screen shot of the sensitivity control form is shown
below
Figure A.2-15 Sensitivity control configuration dialog
To procedure for running a sensitivity analysis is as follows:
1. Select a variable and it's sensitivity function and limits
2. Copy the variable and function to the window on the right.
3. Save the configuration
4. Run the sensitivity
Sensitivity Functions
1. Select Variable List - Select Game to limit the display to the user control variables in
the risk management software. Select All Constants to display all user control
variables in the Vensim model even if they are not displayed in the risk management
software.
2. Function - There are two functions available for modifying a variable, "Vector" and
"RandomUniform".
a. Select Vector to change a variable linearly. Enter a minimum, maximum and how
much to increment the variable in the appropriate input boxes (3)
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b. Select Random Uniform to have Vensim generate a normal distribution between
the specified minimum and maximum values (the increment text box is disabled).
3. Min, Max & Increment boxes are where you enter the desired limits for the sensitivity
analysis. For example, in the shuttle launch rate example described earlier, you
would enter 0, 12 and 1, respectively.
4. Use the left and right arrows to copy the highlighted variable and function parameters
to the sensitivity configuration window. You can also double-click a highlighted item
in either window to the item between the windows as well.
5. This window shows the selected variable(s) and sensitivity function that will be
executed.
6. After modifying or creating a sensitivity configuration you must save it before
attempting to run it.
7. Press the Run Sensitivity button to execute the saved sensitivity configuration. The
results are stored in a data run called, "Sensitivity"
A sensitivity analysis is not limited to modifying only one variable. By adding more than
one variable you can evaluate compound effects. For example, suppose you wanted to
investigate the effect of changes in the workforce budget with different launch rates. This
sort of problem can be extremely laborious to do manually. For example, just three different
budget percentages and the aforementioned 13 launch rates (0 to 12) would require 39
different runs. With the sensitivity control you could instead calculate a random distribution
of budget percentages for each launch rate, yielding a much more detailed analysis with a
fraction of the work. This example is shown below.
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Figure A.2-16 Sensitivity control configuration for two variables
Displaying sensitivity results
After you run a sensitivity analysis the results are automatically loaded 
and saved in a data set
called, "Sensitivity" and any previously loaded runs are removed. To 
see the results, click on
any variable box as would normally to display a trend and select the Sensitivity 
option button on
the form.
To reload the data from a previous simulation run press the Load Runs 
button and re-select the
run.
Note that to display a sensitivity plot the sensitivity run must be thefirst (top) data run listed 
in
the Load Runs dialog bo,x or you will get an error when you try to display 
a sensitivity plot.
The sensitivity plot is displayed as a probability distribution function. 
For example, in the
example below there is a 50% probability that the value is bounded by 
the yellow band, a 75%
probability of being bounded by the green band.
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Figure A.2-17 Sample sensitivity plot
A.2.4 Modifying the Vensim Model
You may find it necessary to make changes to the underlying Vensim 
model. When you are
done with your changes you will need to "Publish" the model 
to make it readable by the
simulation software. To publish a model select Publish from the Vensim 
file menu. A dialog
box similar to the one shown below will appear. Select the same options 
as shown below and
save the file with the same, or a new name as desired. (If you select a new name then 
you will
need to update the simulation tool configuration to load the new model.)
Page 113 of 118
I
Figure A.2-18 Vensim publish model dialog when modifying the Vensim model
A.2.5 Advanced Topics
Creating and modifying scenarios
The scenarios are saved in a Microsoft Access database called, "Safety Game.MDB". You will
need Microsoft Access to open and modify the database.
Modifying existing scenarios
Refer to the diagram below. The scenario database is comprised of three tables
Scenarios - Holds a short description of each scenario that is displayed to the operator
VenVariables - Has an entry for each unique event
Scenario2Variable - Links the Scenarios table to the VenVariables table
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Figure A.2-19 Scenario database table relationships diagram
To modify the text or value of an existing event simply open 
he VenVariables table and make the
change in the appropriate field. However, to add new events 
to a scenario you need to edit both
the VenVariables table (to create the event) and the Scenario2Variables 
table to link the newly
created event to the appropriate scenario. The procedure is three 
steps:
1. Create the new entry in the VenVariables table. Note the unique 
ID number for the event
(.e.g, 22)
2. Open the Scenarios table and note the Unique ID of 
the scenario that you want to
associate the event with.
3. Open the Scenarios2Variable table and on a new row type 
the scenario ID and the event
ID in the ScenarioID, and ID fields, respectively.
Refer to Figures below, which show the relationship between 
the three tables.
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Figure A.2-20 Screen shot of the VenVariables table
Figure 2-21 Screen shot of the Scenarios table
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Figure A.2-22 Screen shot of the Scenario2Variable table which links each event to the right scenario
Creating and modifying system instructions
The system instructions are saved in the table, GamePlay. To create a new instruction simply
enter a new row and ensure the word, "Intro" is entered in the ShortDesc field
Figure A,2-23 Screen shot of the GamePlay table with user instructions
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Error logging
When you first start the software application it will create a Log File directory under the
directory where software is installed. Any software error messages are saved in an error log file
in the log file directory.
A.2.6 Trouble-Shooting
Scenario values are not being written to the model at the correct time
Make sure that you are not advancing the simulation too fast. The simulation tool checks the
database after each advance in time to see if there are any values that need to be written to the
model. If there are, then they are written at the "current" time - not the time in the scenario
database.
Program states that "model has errors" when starting
Sometimes the Vensim model gets corrupted in some fashion. This is usually fixed by
republishing the Vensim model. If that doesn't work, open the model and select, "Reform and
Clean" from the Vensim file menu (under "Model"), save and republish the model
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